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HOW RELIANCE ON THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
OF PUBLIC REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
UNDERMINES FOOD SAFETY IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  THE CASE OF NEEDLED MEAT 
Diana R. H. Winters* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mechanically tenderized meat is a relatively small, although persistent, food-
safety problem in terms of the number of individuals affected by foodborne illness.  
However, the regulatory history of mechanically tenderized meat is a window into 
a much larger issue, that of regulatory inertia and the inadequacy of existing 
mechanisms to counter this stasis.  This regulatory inertia does not have a simple 
cause, nor is it amenable to a simple solution.  It cannot be reduced to a problem of 
agency capture, or a problem with agency incompetence, and although I will 
propose a couple of fixes, all of them have flaws.   
Telling the story of the ongoing conversation on mechanically tenderized meat 
among the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the meat production 
industry, and interest groups representing the consuming public is important for at 
least two reasons.  First, the focus on a food safety problem that is not well known 
to the public illustrates the commonplace nature of regulatory inertia, 
demonstrating that such cases are not confined to high-profile issues with elusive 
solutions.  It is striking that this story of delay and dysfunction takes place in the 
context of a politically uncontroversial issue that is amenable to a simple regulatory 
solution and that is particularly well suited to national regulation.  Although 
regulatory inertia is not easily fixed, the problem with mechanically tenderized beef 
is.    
Second, this story demonstrates the ineffectual nature of private enforcement.  
Private enforcement, in the form of agency-forcing suits, should act as a 
counterpoint to agency delay and dysfunction, by subjecting agency action to 
judicial review.  We expect the judiciary to oversee the process of regulatory 
fermentation, and to ensure that an agency makes its decisions in a timely, 
appropriate manner.  If an agency acts contrary to its statutory mandate, or bows 
excessively to political pressure, then oversight by the neutral judiciary should get 
it back on track.  Here, however, government, industry, and advocacy groups 
representing the consuming public have been discussing this issue for a decade 
while individuals continue to get sick.  Judicial review is, of course, unavailable 
until a party brings suit.  No parties have done so here, although regulatory inaction 
has persisted for over a decade.   
And, if a party does bring suit—for example, imagine that a consumer 
advocacy group sues the USDA for denying its petition requesting that 
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mechanically tenderized meat be labeled—there are shortcomings with the judicial 
review process itself.  These deficiencies include a lack of judicial expertise in the 
complex matters regulated by agencies, a piecemeal approach to solving regulatory 
problems, and difficulty and inconsistency in the implementation of judicial 
directives.  
“Mechanical tenderization,” or “blade tenderization,” or “needling,” or 
“hammering,” is a process where tiny cuts are made in beef by needles or blades, 
which cut the connective tissue and immediately tenderize the meat.1  Mechanical 
tenderization has been used for decades, and meat that has been mechanically 
tenderized is sold to restaurants, hotels, group homes, and, now more frequently to 
grocery stores.2  Statistics about the amount of beef mechanically tenderized per 
year are unavailable, but “a 2008 USDA survey showed that more than 90 percent 
of beef producers are using it on some cuts,” and there is some evidence that the 
amount of beef being mechanically tenderized is increasing.3  Needled meat is 
usually indistinguishable from “intact” meat, and it is usually not labeled.4   
When meat is mechanically tenderized, it becomes more susceptible to 
contamination by pathogens that cause foodborne illness because the needles can 
carry bacteria, such as E. coli, into the interior of the meat, where it is harder to kill 
by cooking.5  There have been at least six recalls of needled meat since 2000, five 
of which were associated with illnesses.6  Because of its increased susceptibility to 
contamination, the USDA recommends that mechanically tenderized meat be 
cooked to a higher temperature than intact cuts of meat.7 
Several times over the last decade, consumer protection and food safety 
advocates have called on the USDA to require the labeling of mechanically 
tenderized meat, and to educate retailers and consumers about the process.8  For the 
most part, the USDA has not responded, although there is currently a proposed rule 
to require the labeling of mechanically tenderized beef in review with the Office of 
                                                                                                     
 1. Bill Marler, My Steak Has Been Needle or Blade Penetrated or Hammered – Really? What 
About E. Coli?, FOOD POISON JOURNAL (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/food-
poisoning-information/my-steak-has-been-needle-or-blade-penetrated-or-hammered-really-what-about-
e-coli/. 
 2. Mike McGraw, Beef’s Raw Edges, KANSAS CITY STAR.COM, (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.kansascity.com/2012/12/08/3951690/beefs-raw-edges.html. 
 3. Id. (quoting David Theno, a beef industry consultant and food safety expert, who commented 
that cattle are coming to market sooner, and “may be less tender than animals that spend more time in 
feedlots”).  
 4. See id. 
 5. See Sarah Zhang, Grosser Than Pink Slime: Poop-Contaminated, Mechanically Tenderized 
Beef, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/12/e-coli-
mechanically-tenderized-beef;Author’s own research (on file with author).  In August 2009, another 
journalist found six E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks associated with mechanically tenderized beef between 
2003 and 2009.  See Gretchen Goetz, Food Safety Advocates to USDA: Require Labeling for Tenderized 
Meat, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/08/advocates-call-
on-usda-to-require-labeling-for-mechanically-tenderized-meat/. 
 6. Infra Section I.B. 
 7. McGraw, supra note 2; Marler, supra note 1. 
 8. See, e.g., Letter from Safe Food Coal., to the Honorable Tom Vilsack, Sec’y, U.S. DEPT. OF 
AGRIC. (June 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.marlerblog.com/uploads/file/SFC_letter_to_Vilsack_Meat_Tenderization_6_12_09[1][1].pdf.  
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Management and Budget (OMB).9   
Exact statistics are difficult to come by, but by most counts mechanically 
tenderized meat has been associated with approximately 100 illnesses, and a 
handful of deaths.10  When compared to other major foodborne illness outbreaks of 
the past decade—listeria-contaminated cantaloupe killed over thirty people in 
2011,11 more than a thousand people were sickened by eggs in 2010,12 over four 
hundred people were hospitalized because of tainted peanut butter in 2009 and at 
least six people died, 13 and in 2006, contaminated spinach sickened 131 people and 
hospitalized at least sixty14—these numbers seem insignificant.  In fact, in August 
of 2012, Dr. Richard Raymond, Undersecretary for Food Safety at the USDA from 
2005-2008, said that although the idea of regulating mechanically tenderized meat 
had been discussed at the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) meetings, 
“the risk [of illness] was not significant enough to require a labeling process.”15 
This “small” problem, however, is particularly amenable to a regulatory 
solution for five reasons.  First, it is extremely hard to bring private actions against 
wrongdoers.16    Second, the harm here is widely diffused.  It is difficult to trace the 
source of foodborne illness to a particular food, much less a particular meat 
processor.  Third, the food supply is a model of information asymmetry.  It is 
difficult even for regulatory agencies to gather information about the treatment of 
meat,17 and even more so for the average consumer.  Fourth, regulating needle-
tenderized meat is politically unremarkable.  It is potentially economically 
impactful, and for this reason, the USDA is subject to industry pressure not to 
regulate, but this is not an issue that is going to raise moral or ethical hackles.18  
Fifth, the regulatory solution here is easy.  Consumer advocates are calling for 
increased information disclosure, which can be implemented without large change 
to the current meat production and distribution system. 
                                                                                                     
 9. Goetz, supra note 5. 
 10. See Zhang, supra note 5; author’s own research (on file with author).  Both illnesses and deaths 
may be undercounted because of underreporting and difficulty in identifying and tracing mechanically 
tenderized meat. 
 11. Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes from Jensen Farms, Colorado, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/index.html. 
 12. Scott Hensley, Salmonella Cases Rise as Recall of Contaminated Eggs Grows, NPR (Jan. 7, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/08/20/129321965/salmonella-recalled-egg-contamination. 
Salmonellosis is an infection caused by the bacteria salmonella. 
 13. Associated Press, More peanut butter products recalled, MSNBC (Jan. 18, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28695782/ns/health-food_safety/. 
 14. Drew Falkenstein, Spinach recall among Huffington Post's worst product recalls of all time, 
FOOD POISON J. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/2010/02/articles/foodborne-illness-
outbreaks/spinach-recall-among-huffington-posts-worst-product-recalls-of-all-time/ 
 15. Goetz, supra note 5.  
 16. Richard A. Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York Univ. Law Sch., Speech at 
Hoover Institution: Environmental Law 101 (Oct. 27, 1998), in HOOVER DIGEST, Apr. 30, 1999, 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7436 (“The governing principle is 
simply this: Wherever it’s hard to organize private actions against admitted wrongdoers, then it is 
permissible to resort to direct governmental regulation . . . .”).  
 17. McGraw, supra note 2. 
 18. Think, for example, of the attempt to switch emergency contraception to over-the-counter status 
for women of all ages.  
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What has taken place over the last decade, however, belies the apparent 
simplicity of this regulatory solution.  The ongoing discussion between the agency, 
industry, and the consuming public (through advocacy groups) has resulted only in 
unfulfilled promises, and regulatory inaction.  Notably absent from this discussion 
is the judiciary.  By continuing to talk to advocacy groups, and repeatedly 
promising action, the agency has thus far been able to avoid suit. 
Is litigation the answer?  I have previously advocated for more litigation in the 
food-safety context, and noted that the paucity of such litigation is a function of 
custom and history, not barriers to suit.19  Filing suit would surely be a step toward 
a resolution of this issue, but it is far from a satisfying answer.  If an advocacy 
group filed a formal petition with an agency that failed to respond or responded 
negatively and the group then sued the delay inherent in the suit would be 
appended to the thirteen prior years of inaction.  And in the context of health and 
safety regulation, this delay is unacceptable.  There must be other mechanisms in 
addition to private enforcement to force agency action in situations where the 
agency itself has evidence that action is warranted, but action is stalled due to 
industry or political pressure. 
First, Congress should increase its use of statutory hammers.  Hammers are 
legislative mechanisms that impose consequences on an agency that fails to act in 
compliance with a statutory mandate.  For example, one type of hammer imposes 
substantive standards to go into effect if an agency fails to regulate by a certain 
date.20  Another converts proposed regulations to final regulations if an agency fails 
to promulgate final regulations in a timely manner.21  
Second, interest groups, including both regulated industry and those 
representing the consuming public should be able to petition the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the OMB, to review agency 
inaction.  Simply put, OIRA, which provides centralized review to certain major 
regulations to assess compliance with cost-benefit principles,22 is theoretically 
positioned to assume a larger role in reviewing agency inaction.  This suggestion is 
subject to several major objections, including OIRA’s limited scope (its review is 
cabined to “significant” regulations, and it currently has no mandate to review 
inaction), and the susceptibility of OIRA to industry pressure and a non-regulatory 
bias.23  Nevertheless, OIRA’s potential as a rationalizing body should not be 
overlooked. 
This Paper proceeds as follows:  Part I discusses mechanically tenderized 
                                                                                                     
 19. Diana R. H. Winters, Not Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability, 
77 BROOK. L. REV. 905 (2012).  
 20. M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 154 (1995).  Magill notes that the 
1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act contain several of these devices.  Id. 
at 154 n.19. 
 21. Id. at 150. 
 22. Curtis Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal 
Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1259 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1267-68 (2006) (arguing that OIRA only reviews regulations to see if 
they are too stringent, not too lax; that OIRA rarely, if ever, reviews decisions to deregulate; that an 
agency inaction is not scrutinized; and that these three factors bias the agency against regulation). 
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meat, and its regulatory history, including a discussion of the history of the 
dialogue that has taken place regarding needled meat between the USDA, the meat 
industry, and the consuming public; Part II discusses the shortcomings of private 
enforcement, including the role that the failure by interest groups to bring suit 
against the agency plays in regulatory inertia, and the potential detriments to 
judicial review; and  Part III discusses my proposals, including an increased use of 
statutory hammers and the expansion of OIRA review. 
I.  THE REGULATION OF MECHANICALLY TENDERIZED BEEF  
OVER THE LAST DECADE 
A.  The Process of Mechanical Tenderization 
As described above, mechanical tenderization is a process where tiny incisions 
are made in a piece of meat, for example, a steak or a roast, by needles or blades.  
This cuts the connective tissue, and immediately tenderizes the meat.24  More than 
90 percent of beef producers are using mechanical tenderization on some cuts to 
improve the quality of the meat, and over fifty million pounds of mechanically 
tenderized meat is sold to restaurants, institutions, and stores each month.25  
Mechanically tenderized meat is indistinguishable from intact meat, and the USDA 
does not require that it be labeled.   
As the needles or blades penetrate the meat, they can carry pathogens, such as 
E. coli,26 that are on the surface of the meat, to the interior of the meat.  Because 
cooking kills many of these pathogens, including E. coli, driving the pathogens into 
the meat makes it more difficult to eradicate any potentially dangerous bacteria.   
This is why the USDA recommends that consumers cook beef steaks (“intact 
meat”) and roasts to an internal temperature of 145 degrees, but recommends that 
ground meat be cooked to 160 degrees.27  The higher temperature is necessary to 
kill pathogens distributed throughout the product in the grinding process. 
Whether mechanically tenderized meat is actually more susceptible to 
contamination by pathogens is contested.  The American Meat Institute (AMI), a 
meat and poultry trade organization, states “the risk of illness from E. coli 
O157:H7 in such products ‘is not significantly higher.’”28  The AMI cited a 2008 
USDA study.  In 2011, however, the Journal of Food Protection found blade-
tenderized steaks to be two to four times riskier than intact meat.29 
Notwithstanding its acknowledgement that mechanically tenderized meat can 
                                                                                                     
 24. Marler, supra note 1.  
 25. McGraw, supra note 2. 
 26. E. coli O157:H7 is a pathogen capable of causing serious foodborne illness in humans. There 
are other dangerous strains of E. coli, but the USDA only began testing for these strains in September 
2011.  See Press Release, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., USDA Takes New Steps to Fight E. Coli, Protect Food 
Supply (Sept. 13, 2011) available at 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2011/09/0400.xml.  
 27. Diane Van, Cooking Meat? Check the New Recommended Temperatures, USDA BLOG (May 
25, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2011/05/25/cooking-meat-check-the-new-recommended-
temperatures/. 
 28. McGraw, supra note 2. 
 29. Id. 
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carry E. coli contamination, the FSIS does not test this meat for E. coli O157:H7.30  
The FSIS does test ground beef, and beef trimmings used to make ground beef for 
this pathogen.31 
B.  Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Mechanically Tenderized Meat 
Since 2000, there have been at least six, and perhaps more, recalls of 
mechanically tenderized meat.32  The Kansas City Star reports “mechanically 
tenderized beef could have been the source of as many as 100 outbreaks of E. coli 
and other illnesses in the United States in recent years . . . affect[ing] more than 
3,100 people who ate contaminated meat.”33 
These recalls include one in June 2003, when 739,000 pounds of meat were 
recalled for E. coli contamination.34 At least eleven cases of foodborne illness 
associated with this recalled meat were reported.35  In December 2009, a quarter 
million pounds of mechanically tenderized meat was recalled after twenty-one 
consumers in sixteen states were sickened with E. coli poisoning.  Nine of the 
consumers were hospitalized.36  The Washington Post reported that this was at least 
the fourth recall associated with mechanically tenderized beef since 2000.37   There 
were two recalls of mechanically tenderized meat in 2012, one of 2,057 pounds, 
and one of 890,000 pounds of meat.38 
The amount of meat recalled over the last decade or so, and the number of 
people made ill by mechanically tenderized meat are difficult to pin down.  
Foodborne illness is historically underreported (many people suffer alone, and even 
those who do go to doctors may not be tested for foodborne illness), and foodborne 
illness is notoriously difficult to trace (even if an affected person could remember 
what exactly she ate, correlating that food with other illness and tracing the food to 
its source are extremely difficult).  Moreover, the USDA does not require meat 
producers to compile and report statistics as to the amount of mechanically 
tenderized meat that they sell. 
                                                                                                     
 30. Food Safety and Inspection Serv., For Business and Industry: Notice 32-05- Verification of 
Establishment’s Reassessment of HACCP Plans to Address Mechanically Tenderized Beef, USDA.GOV, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/HELP/FAQs_TSC_Notice32_05/index.asp (last modified Feb. 13, 2006).   
 31. See Food Safety and Inspection Serv., Microbiology Testing Program for Escherichia coli 
O157:H7 and non-0157 Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC), USDA.GOV, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Ground_Beef_E.Coli_Testing_Results/index.asp (last modified Jan. 
31, 2012).  
 32. See McGraw, supra note 2; See also Zhang, supra note 5. 
 33. McGraw, supra note 2. 
 34. HACCP Plan Reassessment for Mechanically Tenderized Beef Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 30331, 
30332 (May 26, 2005) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Lyndsey Layton, E. Coli-Tainted Beer Infects 21 People in 16 States, WASH. POST., Dec. 30, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/29/AR2009122902772.html?hpid=moreheadlines.  
 37. Id.   
 38. See Recall Release, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., Maine Firm Recalls Ground and Tenderized Beef 
Products Due to Possible E. Coli O157:H7 Contamination (Apr. 11, 2012) available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_024_2012_Release/index.asp; Gretchen Goetz, 
Canadian Beef Recall Grows, Again, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012) 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/10/canadian-beef-recall-grows-again/#.UNTW46C8_ww.   
726 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2 
It is clear, though, that mechanically tenderized meat has been repeatedly and 
consistently associated with outbreaks of foodborne illness.  This phenomenon has 
not escaped the notice of consumer and food-safety interest groups, which have 
been advocating for USDA to more strictly regulate mechanically tenderized beef 
for at least a decade. 
C.  The Conversation About Mechanically Tenderized Meat 
 Since at least 1999, the USDA, industry, and consumer advocacy groups have 
been discussing the safety of needle tenderized meat through a mixture of policy 
statements, informal letters, formal petitions, and scientific studies.  
In January 1999, the FSIS issued a policy statement regarding the 
contamination of meat by E. coli O157:H7.  The statement explained that, as of 
1994, ground beef contaminated with this strain of E. coli was considered 
“adulterated” under the FMIA, and clarified that:  
[W]ith the exception of beef products that are intact cuts of muscle that are to be 
distributed for consumption as intact cuts, an E. coli O157:H7-contaminated beef 
product must not be distributed until it has been processed into a ready-to-eat 
product—i.e., a food product that may be consumed safely without any further 
cooking or other preparation.39 
The FSIS also explained that: 
[I]n evaluating beef products contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, intact cuts of 
muscle that are to be distributed for consumption as intact cuts should be 
distinguished from non-intact products, as well as from intact cuts of muscle that 
are to be further processed into non-intact product prior to distribution for 
consumption.  
 . . .  
Non-intact beef products include beef that has been injected with solutions, 
mechanically tenderized by needling, cubing, Frenching, or pounding devices, or 
reconstructed into formed entrees (e.g., beef that has been scored to incorporate a 
marinade, beef that has a solution of proteolytic enzymes applied to or injected 
into the cut of meat, or a formed and shaped product such as beef gyros). 
Pathogens may be introduced below the surface of these products as a result of the 
processes by which they are made.40 
 In other words, any non-intact beef product, including needle tenderized meat, 
contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 was to be considered “adulterated,” and 
therefore would be prohibited from entering the marketplace.  Intact cuts of meat 
contaminated with this strain of E. coli are not considered adulterated, and can be 
sold in the marketplace.  This is because heat can kill pathogens such as E. coli, 
and cooking will thereby kill pathogens on the outside of intact meat.  However, 
the pathogens found on the interior of non-intact meat are harder to kill.      
                                                                                                     
 39. Beef Products Contaminated With Escherichia Coli O157:H7, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2804 
(proposed Jan. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 3).  Policy statements do not carry the binding 
force of law, but are intended to inform regulated entities and the public about the agency’s proposed 
interpretation of its statutes.  Here, for example, USDA is indicating that these are the types of meat that 
it will consider adulterated under the FMIA, although the policy statement itself is not binding. 
 40. Id. 
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 In 2002, in response to lobbying by the meat industry to include mechanically 
tenderized meat in the intact-meat exception, the FSIS affirmed the policy that non-
intact meat, including mechanically tenderized meat, was to be considered 
adulterated if found to be contaminated with E. coli O157:H7.41  The agency stated 
that in 2001, the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods (NACMCF) concluded that “non-intact, blade tenderized beef steaks could 
potentially contain an infective dose of E. coli O157:H7 in their interior . . . [and] 
that blade-tenderized steaks may pose a risk, particularly to immune-compromised 
individuals, when served very rare with cold spots (that is, when cooked to an 
internal temperature of less than 120[deg]F).”42 
 In 2002, a three-year-old girl named Brianna Kriefall died and numerous 
other individuals were sickened after eating food at a Sizzler restaurant that had 
been cross-contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 from raw cuts of intact meat.  The 
company that sold the restaurant the meat acknowledged that the meat was 
contaminated, but argued that it was not adulterated under the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act because the FSIS, pursuant to its 1999 policy statement, did not 
consider such meat to be adulterated.43  
 After this incident, Denis Stearns, a prominent food safety advocate, formally 
petitioned USDA to amend its 1999 policy statement to “exclude any intact cut of 
meat intended for further processing at retail,” which would have included the meat 
sold to the Sizzler restaurant.44  Thus, if a restaurant planned to buy intact meat and 
either grind, or tenderize this meat on premises, it could be sure that the meat was 
not contaminated by E. coli.  This policy would theoretically prevent incidents like 
the Sizzler outbreak, where other food was cross-contaminated by pathogens 
spread through on-site processing.  In 2009, in a blog post regarding USDA’s 
policy on intact and non-intact meat and adulteration with E. coli, Stearns wrote 
that “the USDA simply punted, stating that ‘because the issues raised in your 
petition are related to the matters discussed in the October 7, 2002 notice . . . the 
Agency will consider your petition in conjunction with the comments received in 
response to that document.’  And that was over five years ago.”45 
 In June 2009, the Safe Food Coalition, which comprises the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, the Center for Foodborne Illness Research and 
Prevention, the Consumer Federation of America, and Food & Water Watch, wrote 
                                                                                                     
 41. E. Coli O157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62325 (proposed Oct. 7, 2002) 
(to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417); Letter from Nat’l Meat Ass’n to Food Safety and Inspection Serv. 
(Apr. 28, 2000) available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/99-060N/99-060N-294.pdf 
(requesting the exception of tenderized meat from the FSIS’s E. coli O157:H7 policy); FOOD SAFETY 
AND INSPECTION SERV., COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INTACT (NON-TENDERIZED) AND NON-
INTACT (TENDERIZED) BEEF: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2002) available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Beef_Risk_Assess_ExecSumm_Mar2002.pdf. 
 42. E. Coli O157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, supra note 41, at 62333. 
 43. Estate of Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 665 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding state tort claims against the company not foreclosed by USDA’s policy statement).    
 44. Petition from Denis Stearns to the USDA (Oct. 3, 2002) (on file with author). 
 45. Denis Diderot, More USDA Doubletalk on E. Coli and Swift Meat Recall, DAILY KOS (Jul. 13, 
2009, 2:13 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/07/13/753082/-More-USDA-Doubletalk-on-E-
coli-Swift-Meat-Recall (discussing the USDA’s history regarding the E. coli contamination of intact and 
non–intact meat). 
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a letter to Tom Vilsack, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, requesting 
that the USDA immediately initiate regulatory action to require the labeling of 
mechanically tenderized meat, and to begin educating the consuming public of the 
dangers of this process.46 
 In a document providing background information to Secretary Vilsack, the 
Coalition explained that each month, over 50 million pounds of mechanically 
tenderized beef products was produced, and that “a preponderance of beef plants 
are processing, distributing and selling [mechanically tenderized] beef products,” 
and noted that there had been several foodborne illness outbreaks associated with 
mechanically tenderized meat “[i]n recent years.”47  The Coalition was concerned 
about three things: (1) the lack of testing of mechanically tenderized beef source 
materials, (2) the lack of labeling requirements for mechanically tenderized beef, 
and (3) misleading cooking guidelines for mechanically tenderized meat published 
by USDA.48  
 Simply put, because the USDA expects consumers to protect themselves from 
pathogens by cooking mechanically tenderized meat to a higher temperature than 
intact steak, it should require that such meat be labeled so that consumers know 
what they are buying.  USDA, however, does not require that mechanically 
tenderized beef be labeled, thereby leaving consumers no way of knowing how 
they should cook their meat.  The Coalition wrote that it “strongly believes that the 
lack of labeling of MT [mechanically tenderized] beef products, along with FSIS’ 
low recommended cooking guidelines and temperatures for intact beef products, 
poses a serious and unnecessary threat to public health.”49 
 The meat producing industry, including the American Meat Institute, the trade 
organization representing meat and poultry producers, opposes mandatory labeling 
guidelines for needled meat, on two grounds.  First, the organization asserts that 
meat treated in this manner is as safe as intact steak, and therefore requires no 
special labeling.50  Second, regardless of the comparable safety of mechanically 
tenderized meat, the industry asserts that labeling will not improve food safety.  In 
this view, labeling will discourage meat producers from intervening to prevent 
foodborne pathogens from contaminating the meat at the source.  Moreover, 
representatives of the industry say that it is possible that restaurants will ignore the 
labels and continue to cook meat to order.  These two developments combined 
could potentially lead to more foodborne illness, as producers decrease pathogen 
elimination measures in response to labeling and consumers ignore the labels.51  
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These concerns about labeling dovetail with those of the former Undersecretary for 
Food Safety at USDA, Dr. Raymond, who felt that the potential harm that labeling 
could do to the industry was not counterbalanced by the good that labels could 
do.52 
D.  Conclusion 
 The dialogue regarding mechanically tenderized meat that has taken place 
over the last decade between industry, advocacy groups, and the administrative 
agency in charge of meat products highlights the shortcomings of the current 
regulatory system for food safety and the inability of private enforcement to 
overcome these shortcomings.  There is a defined and discrete problem—the 
increased potential for the contamination by foodborne pathogens of mechanically 
tenderized meat over intact meat—and a relatively simple solution, which is better 
labeling and consumer education.  There is an awareness of the problem among 
food safety specialists, regulators, industry, and, recently, the mainstream media.   
If we see the dialogue itself as a positive, the regulatory system is working just 
as it should.  Dialogue between government, industry, and the public as regulatory 
beneficiary can arguably increase the legitimacy of the regulatory process, which is 
“associated with such conventional notions as ensurance of legality, protection 
against arbitrariness and selectivity, promotion of procedural regularity, and 
ensurance against the twin evils of factional tyranny and self-interested 
representation.”53  If we see “the purpose of administrative agencies [as] help[ing] 
to define and realize social and economic norms in industrialized society,” and 
regulation as “part of a continuing process of deciding what sort of society we shall 
be,”54 then the decade of back and forth is productive in and of itself, even absent 
regulatory action.  It is hard, however, to view the goal of the regulatory system as 
fulfilled by dialogue when the public continues to get sick from eating unlabeled 
mechanically tenderized meat. 
 Why has there been no regulatory action?  Perhaps this is just a small 
problem, and labeling needled meat would harm the industry more than it would 
help the consumer, as argued by certain government officials and industry 
representatives.  There are several flaws in this argument, however.  The first flaw 
is the frequent and repeated foodborne illness outbreaks associated with 
mechanically tenderized meat.   
The second is its untested nature.  Maybe there are no more outbreaks 
associated with needled meat than with intact steak.  Maybe the incidence of E. coli 
contamination is decreasing across the board.  But it is impossible for the 
consuming public to neutrally evaluate these claims, or to evaluate the claims of 
food safety advocates calling for labeling requirements.  Publicly available studies 
contain conflicting and obtuse information. 
Moreover, this is a subject that is perfectly amenable to regulation.  It is 
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sufficiently arcane that the consuming public will not only have no knowledge of 
the vicissitudes of the meat it eats, nor will it care.  The USDA is charged with 
keeping the meat supply safe, and the American public trusts it, and needs it to do 
its job.   
Who then should determine whether regulation really is called for here?  Such 
a dispute may call for a judicial solution, or at least for judicial review.  Judicial 
review could provide a forum for the presentation of the research on both sides of 
the issue, and an evaluation of whether the agency has done its job here and 
adhered to its statutory mandate of protecting the safety of the American food 
supply.  But, of course, the judiciary is not involved here, because suit has not been 
brought against the USDA.  Even if judicial review was invoked, it could add a 
layer of difficulty to the evaluation of the need to regulate mechanically tenderized 
meat.  And herein lies the problem (or problems) with the mechanism of private 
enforcement. 
II.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
 Agency-forcing suits, wherein a private party sues an administrative agency 
to force or change agency action, are integral to the American regulatory system.  
These suits serve a valuable function, by increasing public participation, mitigating 
industry influence, and encouraging the agency to comply with its statutory 
mandate.  However, an over-reliance on this private enforcement mechanism, 
coupled with the absence of any other mechanisms to spur regulatory action, leads 
to regulatory inertia in some situations.  This Part looks at why this is so, analyzing 
the problems caused by interest group pressure and the threat of suit, as well as the 
problems caused by judicial review itself. 
A.  The Potential Detriments of Advocacy Group Pressure 
 The potential for private parties to bring agency-forcing suits is part of the 
structure of the regulatory system, and shapes the regulatory process from the 
outset.55  Over the last sixty years or so, the regulatory apparatus has adjusted to 
and become reliant on private rights of enforcement to enforce, and also to shape 
the regulatory regime. 
Private parties and the availability of the private right of initiation are a 
presence during the congressional shaping of a statutory mandate, and through the 
transformation of this mandate into regulation.  Special interests have a voice when 
statutes are written, and are taken into account when general statutory mandates are 
translated into specific implementable regulations.  Under the Clean Air Act, for 
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example, the Administrator of the EPA is directed to establish a list of air 
pollutants “emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare . . . .”56  
The EPA must translate the phrase “endanger public health or welfare” to an 
emissions amount for each regulated air pollutant.  This process, although couched 
in terms of science, is heavily policy-influenced, and therefore susceptible to 
special interest pressure.57  
 Regulations next move through the notice and comment period,58 which 
provides a formal voice to private parties, but is also approached by agencies with 
an eye toward preparing a record for any ensuing challenge.  After a final 
regulation is issued, private parties may challenge the agency’s decision-making 
process in regards to the issuance of the regulation and the implementation of the 
regulation.   
So what we have is a regime where the right of private enforcement works 
both implicitly and explicitly to influence regulation throughout.  How can this be 
detrimental one may ask?  Even if the input of advocacy groups and other special 
interest does not always facilitate the regulatory process, how can broadened 
participation hurt the system?  There are at least two ways in which the potential 
for agency-forcing suits can be detrimental.  First is the process’s exclusionary 
nature, and second is its discretionary nature. 
To call the process exclusive may seem counterintuitive, because again, 
participation appears to be broadened.   In the private enforcement scheme, 
regulation is not something imposed by government on the public, but is rather 
shaped and adjusted to take into account the advocacy of various members of 
society.  Regulated entities and regulated beneficiaries have a voice in the process. 
But engaging in this process entails high costs. An individual or group that 
desires to take part in the regulatory process must first of all have the expertise 
needed to address the often complex and scientific nature of health and safety 
regulation.  It must also have the resources available to actually engage in 
conversation with a regulated agency, which include personnel and connections.  
And finally, the individual or group must have the resources and the expertise to 
engage in suit if necessary. The specter of judicial review is a necessary bargaining 
tool.   
In addition, the individual benefit afforded by the regulatory process may be 
small and diffuse.  Think, for example, of mechanically tenderized meat.  
Advocacy groups are calling for product labeling and consumer education, which 
would benefit consumers as a whole, but the benefits of which would be hard to 
assess individually. 
For these reasons, the groups involved in the regulatory process are restricted 
to several repeat players, such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest and 
the Natural Resources Defense Council.  These groups play an extremely valuable 
role in the regulatory process but their small number threatens to ossify the 
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conversation, both in terms of public perception and in reality.  Members of the 
public who are not part of any of the active groups involved in the conversation are 
shut out. 
And second, the reliance on private enforcement to goad and correct the 
regulatory process is dependent on the discretion of private parties.  This is only a 
problem in that the groups involved in the regulatory process are subject to 
constraints that may artificially restrict on which subjects they bring to bear their 
power.  These constraints include the needs and desires of their constituency, their 
resource allocation decisions, and even the personal interests and preferences of 
their staff attorneys.  For example, the Center for Science in the Public Interest 
brought several suits against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 1980s 
on food safety issues, but is now focusing its litigation energy on fraudulent 
marketing suits focused on combatting the obesity epidemic. Although this is very 
important, food safety issues have not lessened since the 1980s.    
The discretionary nature of private enforcement is harmful to the regulatory 
process because agencies focus their attention on issues brought to their attention 
by private parties to the exclusion of other topics.  Moreover, ongoing dialogue 
with these parties may actually increase the time before agency action, especially in 
areas of political tension.  Even in areas that are not particularly politically charged, 
such as mechanically tenderized meat, we see a prolonged dialogue between certain 
advocacy groups, industry, and government, with no lawsuits filed against the 
agency, and no regulatory action.  
B.  Some Problems with the Judicial Review of Agency Action or Inaction 
Next, if a private party does bring suit against an agency, aspects of the 
judicial process can have a detrimental effect on the regulatory process.  First, there 
is an expertise gap between the judiciary, which usually consists of non-scientists, 
and the agency.  Health, safety, and environmental regulation often entail issues of 
scientific complexity and uncertainty.  The structure of the judicial review of 
agency decision making incorporates different levels of deference and review, 
which are both statutorily prescribed and policy-driven, to account for this gap.59  
Nevertheless, the need for courts to review specialized and scientific 
determinations is time-consuming and open to error.  Moreover, it may be difficult 
for courts to distinguish scientific judgments from policy judgments in determining 
the legality of agency action or inaction.60 
Second, if the judiciary is not itself neutral, its utility as a neutral overseer of 
agency action is lessened.  Judicial review subjects agency decision making to 
outside scrutiny by allegedly nonpartisan and nonpolitical adjudicators.  Ideally, 
this review will ferret out corruption and self-interested or political decision 
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making, and can realign the agency with its statutory mandate.61  But studies have 
shown that judges vote consistently with the values espoused by the political party 
of their sponsors.62  Commentators also argue that levels of deference can be 
manipulated by judges expressing political preference.63   
 Agency-forcing suits can also intrude into agency decision making.  Although 
it is possible to positively view judicial focus on specific disputes before the 
court,64 this focus can also preclude a consideration of the wide view that 
incorporates factors external to the particular controversy.65  For example, in a 
recent case, a judge ordered the FDA to hold hearings on the withdrawal of 
approval for the subtherapeutic (levels below those necessary to treat disease) use 
of certain antibiotics.66  He noted that the FDA, in opposing these hearings, argued 
that it had shifted its approach regarding these antibiotics, and that the hearings 
were no longer necessary.67  Although the judge found this explanation 
implausible,68 it is possible to see that the court order may have the effect of 
redirecting an agency’s entire policy on antibiotics in animal feed, as well as 
affecting the agency’s resource decisions in other matters.69   
 Finally, the long process of judicial review may inject an element of 
uncertainty into the regulatory process, undermining public confidence in the 
regulatory bodies.  During review, a regulatory decision generally remains in 
effect, “but the agency’s position surely has a cloud of uncertainty during this time.  
Even after a judicial decision, nonacquiescence may leave the state of a regulation 
uncertain for years.”70  For example, in 2009, a court ordered the FDA to 
reconsider its decision on the over-the-counter availability of emergency 
contraception.  The FDA, however, did nothing until the advocacy groups that had 
originally sued the agency filed a motion to hold the FDA in contempt.71 
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III.  TWO PROPOSALS 
 By providing a snapshot of one small, yet persistent regulatory problem, I 
have tried to demonstrate the inadequacy of private enforcement to spur regulatory 
action.  This is not to say that private enforcement should be eliminated, however.  
Agency-forcing suits play an important role in the regulatory process, and can, in 
some circumstances, improve regulatory outcomes.72  Additional mechanisms, 
however, are necessary to counter the problem of agency inertia in areas affecting 
the public health and safety, and here I present two suggestions.    
A.  The Increased Use of Statutory Deadlines and Hammers 
Congress has numerous methods to control the behavior of administrative 
agencies, including the manipulation of funding, “the specification of requisite 
procedures for agency decision making,” the prescription of substantive standards 
for the agency to meet, the use of administrative deadlines, and the imposition of 
statutory hammers.73  I discuss the possible benefits of the increased use of 
administrative deadlines and statutory hammers.  
 What are hammers?  Statutory hammers add a layer of consequence to a 
statutory deadline.  For example, some statutes provide a deadline before which an 
agency must act, and prescribe substantive standards that will go into effect if the 
deadline is not met.74  The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act contains a 
different kind of hammer—it required the agency to establish proposed regulations 
within twelve months, which became final if final regulations were not 
promulgated in the next twelve months.75 
 It is relatively easy to imagine how the increased use of statutory deadlines 
coupled with hammers could accelerate the regulatory process in an area such as 
mechanically tenderized meat.  Congress could amend the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act to mandate that the USDA pass regulations on the labeling of non-intact meat 
with its production process and suggested cooking temperatures.  This amended 
provision could include a deadline and a hammer.  The USDA could therefore 
work with industry to attempt to ameliorate consumer confusion regarding 
mechanically tenderized meat, but if it missed its deadline, mandatory labeling 
would go into place. 
 Of course, Congress may not be inclined to pass such a measure because it 
too may be subject to pressure or influence from the meat industry.  Moreover, 
even when statutes are prescriptive, agency discretion remains.  For example, the 
USDA could redefine mechanically tenderized meat out of the “non-intact” meat 
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category (although it would probably not do so at this point, and such a decision 
would be open to judicial challenge).  
B.  Allowing Petitions to OIRA to Review Agency Inaction 
Another possible solution is for the Executive to amend the mandate of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize it to review agency inaction as well 
as significant agency actions.  The OIRA was created in 1980 by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act,76 and the office was initially responsible for reviewing agencies’ 
information collection requests.77  Under President Reagan, however, the office 
became, and remains, charged with the centralized review of regulation.  President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which required agencies to prepare a 
cost/benefit analysis for major rules, and to send a copy of each proposed or final 
rule to the OIRA before publication.78  The goals of centralized review during the 
Reagan era were twofold: (1) to coordinate the regulatory state and promote 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and (2) to cut down on unnecessary (and 
overzealous) regulation.79  Critics have shown, however, that OIRA’s main focus 
during the Reagan years was deregulation, and that the coordinating role of OIRA 
was deprioritized.80  
 President Clinton replaced Order 12,291 with Order 12,866, which 
maintained the framework of executive review of regulatory decision making, 
while increasing transparency and introducing certain considerations in rulemaking 
review that arguably reduced the body’s anti-regulatory bias.81  President George 
W. Bush again modified OIRA’s mandate, and imposed an explicitly anti-
regulation expansion of presidential oversight over agency decision making.82  
President Obama, however, reinstated Clinton’s Order 12,866 after he took office.83 
 President Clinton’s innovations notwithstanding, critics argue that the OIRA 
review is structured to be anti-regulation because the OIRA only reviews 
regulations to see if they are too stringent, not too lax; that the OIRA rarely, if ever, 
reviews decisions to deregulate; and that agency inaction is not scrutinized.84  
However, the OIRA, as a “centralized agency with command over the regulatory 
state,” is uniquely positioned to play a larger role in ensuring that agencies adhere 
to their statutory mandates.85  Agency inaction can arguably be an equal or greater 
economic drain than regulatory action, and the OIRA should have the authority to 
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review an agency’s failure to act. 
CONCLUSION 
The increased potential for contamination by foodborne pathogen of 
mechanically tenderized meat is a problem well-suited for federal regulation.  Meat 
is distributed nationally, and uniformity of the product is important to purchasers.  
The problem here can be ameliorated with a mandatory labeling requirement and 
increased consumer education, which are relatively easy solutions.  If the market 
for mechanically tenderized meat decreased after mandatory labeling requirements, 
meat producers would have to find a way to make the meat that they sold safer.   
This is not a situation where the USDA can argue that it has made different 
resource allocation decisions (i.e., it has regulated elsewhere and therefore has no 
resources left over to focus on mechanically tenderized meat).  The amount of time 
spent on dialogue with advocacy groups and the numerous studies done regarding 
this type of meat show that resources have already been expended.  Yet over a 
decade, no regulatory action has been taken.  Dialogue has gone nowhere. 
No single label defines the problem here.  Industry pressure, resource 
allocation decisions, and diffuse agency inertia have all played a part.  Regardless, 
however, of the source of the problem, private enforcement is inadequate to force 
change.  To improve the regulation of public health and safety, either Congress or 
the Executive, or both, must act. 
 
 
